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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION DECISIONS FROM THE
OCTOBER 2008 TERM
Drew S. Days, III*
I. INTRODUCTION
Several employment discrimination decisions were handed
down this Term.' They were Ricci v. DeStefano (Title VII); 2 Gross v.
FBL Financial Services, Inc. (Age Discrimination in Employment
Act);3 AT & T Corp. v. Hulteen (Pregnancy Discrimination Act);4 and
14 Penn Plaza L.L. C. v. Pyett, which concerned the impact of arbi-
tration agreements upon the reach of federal employment discrimina-
tion laws.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 contains two provi-
sions that are important in understanding some of the litigation that
has ensued over the years.6 The first is the "Disparate Treatment
. Alfred M. Rankin Professor of Law, Yale Law School; B.A., 1963, Hamilton College;
L.L.B., 1966, Yale Law School. Professor Days has held the positions of Assistant Attorney
General for Civil Rights, nominated by President Jimmy Carter and confirmed by Senate in
1977, and United States Solicitor General, nominated by President Clinton and confirmed by
Senate in 1993. This Article is based on a presentation given at the Practising Law Insti-
tute's Eleventh Annual Supreme Court Review Program in New York, New York.
1 See Perry Craft & Michael G. Sheppard, Summary of United States Supreme Court's
2008 Term, 45 TENN. B.J. 21, 24-25 (2009).
2 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2664 (2009) (5-4 decision).
129 S. Ct. 2343, 2346 (2009) (5-4 decision).
4 129 S. Ct. 1962, 1966 (2009).
129 S. Ct. 1456, 1461 (2009) (5-4 decision).
6 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (West 2009). The statute states, in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-- (1) to fail
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, con-
ditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classi-
fy his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would
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Provision."7 A plaintiff can bring suit if he or she can show that an
employer acted in a discriminatory fashion on an impermissible ba-
sis.8 "[It] is the most easily understood type of discrimination. The
employer simply treats some people less favorably than others be-
cause of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."9 These
are individual suits for the most part, although there are variations.' 0
The other is the "Disparate Impact Provision." In 1971, the
Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co." held that where a
plaintiff can show that an employment screening device had a dispro-
portionate race, color, religion, sex, or national origin effect, and the
employer could not show that the device was "job related" or "con-
sistent with business necessity," Title VII was also violated. 12 The
concepts of disparate treatment and disparate impact have been im-
ported into other employment discrimination laws,13 such as the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1968.
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act was a free-standing
amendment to Title VII.14  Congress enacted it because of United
States Supreme Court decisions which held essentially that discrimi-
nation based on pregnancy did not violate the Constitution or Title
VII.15  The Pregnancy Discrimination Act reflected a congressional
determination that, although Congress could not do much about the
Constitution, it certainly could do something about Title VII. 16
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such in-
dividual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id
7 Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
8 id
9 Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
10 See Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 155-56 (1982) (permitting indi-
viduals to maintain class action suits under Title VII if they meet prerequisites that " 'limit
the class claims to those fairly encompassed by the named plaintiff s claims' " (quoting Gen.
Tel. Co. of the Nw. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 330 (1980))).
" 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
12 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (West 2009); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
13 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (amending Title VII and officially codifying dispa-
rate impact); 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981a(a)(1) (West 2009) (permitting recovery of both compen-
satory and punitive damages for victims of disparate treatment).
14 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(k) (West 2009).
15 See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 145-46 (1976) (holding that Title VII
did not bar discrimination on the basis of pregnancy or pregnancy-related conditions).
16 See Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 737 (explaining that Congress
took action in order "to ensure that family-care leave would no longer be stigmatized as an
inordinate drain on the workplace").
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2
Touro Law Review, Vol. 26 [2010], No. 2, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol26/iss2/6
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
II. Ricci v. DESTEFANO
In Ricci v. DeStefano, a decision involving Judge Soto-
mayor-now Justice Sotomayor' 7-the Second Circuit affirmed the
decision of the lower court, finding that there was no violation of
Title VII in the treatment of white firefighters by the City of New
Haven, Connecticut.18 However, there was a question about whether
the summary affirmance was an adequate treatment of the lower court
decision.' 9 An unsuccessful effort was made to have this matter re-
viewed en banc. 20 Judge Jose Cabranes dissented from the denial of
rehearing en banc, and essentially laid out his reasons for believing
that the Ricci case was important and needed the attention of the Su-
preme Court.2'
Meanwhile, the panel had withdrawn its summary affirmance
and entered a per curiam opinion that actually gave some reasons for
its determination.22 It was only a paragraph long, and described why
the panel felt that the lower court had acted properly under the cir-
cumstances, and why there was no reason for this matter to be consi-
dered en banc.23
The facts of the Ricci case are as follows. New Haven de-
cided that it needed to fill the higher ranks of its fire department, and
gave an examination to that end.24 That examination produced a re-
sult that the city refused to certify,25 because there were not enough
black candidates who scored sufficiently high to be eligible for the
17 Charlie Savage, Senate Confirms Sotomayor for the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
7, 2009, at Al.
18 Ricci v. DeStefano (Ricci ll), 264 F. App'x 106, 107 (2d Cir. 2008).
19 Ricci v. DeStefano (Ricci IV), 530 F.3d 88, 93 (2d Cir. 2008) (Cabranes, J., dissenting)
(explaining that the court initially affirmed the lower court's decision but then withdrew it
and issued a per curium opinion affirming the lower court); see Ricci v. DeStefano (Ricci
III), 530 F.3d 87, 87 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (withdrawing the court's previous summary
judgment and affirming the lower court's decision per curiam).
20 Ricci IV, 530 F.3d at 88 (majority opinion) (denying a rehearing en banc).
21 Id. at 93 (Cabranes, J., dissenting) (explaining and listing complex questions, which the
dissent hoped the Supreme Court would resolve).
22 Ricci III, 530 F.3d at 87.
23 Ricci IV, 530 F.3d at 88 (majority opinion) (denying a rehearing en banc); Ricci III, 530
F.3d at 87.
24 Ricci v. DeStefano (Ricci V), 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2665 (2009) (5-4 decision).
25 Id (explaining that the New Haven Civil Service Board will certify by rank the individ-
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upper level positions.26 The plaintiffs, white firefighters who had
achieved high marks on the examination, alleged that they had been
denied promotions on account of race in violation of Title VII and the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 27 This was a
claim of disparate treatment.28 The city's defense was that it did not
urge certification of the results for fear that to do so would open it up
to Title VII liability for potential claims brought by black firefighters,
because of the test's racially disparate impact. 29 It was a situation of
disparate impact confronting disparate treatment.
The question for the Court was as follows: what does an em-
ployer need to show to justify rejecting on intentionally racial
grounds the results of a professionally-developed employment test in
order to avoid Title VII disparate impact liability?30 The Court was
confronted with several opposing formulations on how to answer this
question.3 1 One was the position of the plaintiffs, which was that
employers can never justify making decisions based upon race under
these circumstances, even if the employer knows that its decisions
would violate the Disparate Impact Provision. 32 In other words, "un-
der Title VII, avoiding unintentional discrimination cannot justify in-
tentional discrimination."3 3 That is a fairly "zero-tolerance" position.
The alternative formulation was that an employer "must be in [actual]
violation of the disparate-impact provision before it can use com-
pliance as a defense in a disparate treatment suit." 34
The City of New Haven had yet another point of view: "[A]n
employer's good-faith belief that its actions are necessary to comply
with Title VII's disparate-impact provision should be enough to justi-
fy race-conscious conduct." 35 However, in the opinion written by
Justice Kennedy-joined by Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Sca-
26 Id. at 2673 (explaining that the evidence showed that the city refused to certify the re-
sults because of the disparity between the test scores of minority and white candidates).
27 Id. at 2664.
28 Id. at 2671.
29 Ricci V, 129 S. Ct. at 2664.
30 Id. at 2674 (considering "whether the purpose to avoid disparate-impact liability
excuses what otherwise would be prohibited disparate-treatment discrimination").
31 Id at 2674-75 (turning to each party's proposed meaning of Title VII and attempting to
strike a balance between these competing theories).
32 Id. at 2674.
33 id.
34 Ricci V, 129 S. Ct. at 2674.
3 Id. at 2674-75.
494 [Vol. 26
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lia, Thomas, and Alito-the Court adopted a third and admittedly
new test, instead of the ones that had been offered.36 The Court held
that an employer may not make race-based decisions unless it can
show "a strong basis in evidence" of disparate impact liability.37 Ap-
plying this standard to the facts of Ricci, the Court found that New
Haven lacked a strong basis in evidence for refusing to certify the ex-
amination results.38
Where did the test that Justice Kennedy set out in Ricci come
from? He drew the test from cases under the Equal Protection Clause
of the Constitution where the allegations were that race or gender was
used to disadvantage one group of government employees or appli-
cants.39
Justice Ginsburg wrote a dissent in which Justices Stevens,
Souter, and Breyer joined. She challenged the majority's assertion
that the "disparate treatment" and "disparate impact" provisions of
Title VII were in conflict.40 It is curious that Justice Kennedy's opi-
nion does not address "whether a legitimate fear of disparate impact
[liability] is ever sufficient to justify discriminatory treatment under
the Constitution."4 1 Justice Scalia acknowledged this and said that
although Justice Kennedy may not have wanted to address it, "the
war between disparate impact and equal protection will be waged
sooner or later, and it behooves us to begin thinking about how-and
on what terms-to make peace between them."42 This is one of the
"markers" to be found in more than one of the Supreme Court's deci-
sions of this past Term. By "markers," I mean statements in Supreme
Court decisions that either suggest that a particular statutory provi-
sion may be courting a finding of unconstitutionality or may be
Id. at 2676.
_Id. at 2677 ("[B]efore an employer can engage in intentional discrimination for the as-
serted purpose of avoiding or remedying an unintentional disparate impact, the employer
must have a strong basis in evidence to believe it will be subject to disparate-impact liability
if it fails to take the race-conscious, discriminatory action.").
" Id. at 2681 ("On the record before us, there is no genuine dispute that the City lacked a
strong basis in evidence to believe it would face disparate-impact liability if it certified the
examination results.").
" Ricci V, 129 S. Ct. at 2675-76.
40 Id. at 2699 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
41 Id. at 2675-76 (majority opinion) ("This suit does not call on us to consider whether the
statutory constraints under Title VII must be parallel in all respects to those under the Con-
stitution. That does not mean the constitutional authorities are irrelevant, however.").




Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2010
TOURO LAWREVIEW
amended to overcome a restrictive Supreme Court construction.
Justice Alito wrote a separate concurrence, joined by Justices
Scalia and Thomas, that said a lot about the way Ricci was framed in
terms of its factual allegations.43 There were no findings of fact since
the district court decided the case on summary judgment.4 Yet, the
concurrence was devoted almost entirely to what Justice Alito viewed
as the case's "racial politics" overhang.45
What does this all mean with respect to any ultimate resolu-
tion of the tension between the disparate impact and disparate treat-
ment provisions of Title VII? First, it was very surprising that the
Supreme Court granted review. This was a case decided on summary
judgment from one district court, in one circuit in the entire country
raising potentially quite significant issues, but not issues that were
developed in the lower courts. Second, the Court may have just been
looking for cases that raised issues about the use of race in various
contexts,46 as it did, for example, earlier in the Parents Involved in
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 147 (schools) and
Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. One v. Holder
(NAMUDNO) 48 (voting) cases. Ricci presented a very attractive ve-
hicle for the Court to do so in an employment discrimination case be-
cause of its sympathetic factors. 49  The white lead plaintiff, Frank
Ricci, a dyslexic, worked very hard to prepare for the examination,
and he qualified.o To deny him and the other plaintiffs their "just
desserts" may have struck the majority as fundamentally unfair.
There is one other consideration that was not addressed in any
of the opinions. In the late 1970s, the four agencies of the federal
43 Id. (Alito, J., concurring) ("[Tihe dissent . . . provides an incomplete description of the
events . . .. [W]hen all of the evidence in the record is taken into account, it is clear that,
even if the legal analysis in Parts II and 111-A of the dissent were accepted, affirmance of the
decision below is untenable.").
4 Ricci V, 129 S. Ct. at 2665 (majority opinion).
4S Id. at 2690 n. 1 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Never mind the flawed tests New Haven
used and the better selection methods used elsewhere, Justice ALITO's concurring opinion
urges. Overriding all else, racial politics, fired up by a strident African-American pastor,
were at work in New Haven." (citing id. at 2685-88 (Alito, J., concurring))).
4 See id. at 2672 (majority opinion).
4' 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (plurality opinion).
48 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009).
49 See Ricci V, 129 S. Ct. at 2664 (discussing the high stakes of the examinations the fire-
fighters took and their expenditures to adequately study for those examinations, in both their
time and money).
5o Id. at 2667.
[Vol. 26496
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government responsible for then enforcing federal employment dis-
crimination laws-the Justice Department, Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission, Labor Department, and Civil Service Com-
mission--decided what standards ought to govern disparate impact
claims.5  These standards defined what types of tests would be
viewed as professionally-developed, and therefore, could be relied on
to defend against discrimination suits. 52 One product of that collec-
tive effort was the "Four-Fifths Rule."53 Generally, under that rule, if
the selection rate of the lower scoring group is above four-fifths of
the rate of the higher group, the federal government agencies will not
bring disparate impact suits against an employer.54 It does not bar
suits by private parties. The disparity in Ricci was below the four-
fifths level, and therefore, was potentially susceptible to challenge by
the federal government.
So what is this about? For many years there has been, in
some quarters, displeasure with the 1971 Supreme Court decision in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 55  In the late 1980s, the Court itself de-
cided several cases that were designed to sap Griggs of much of its
power.56 It rejected many of those standards and made it easier for
employers to justify cases where there was a disparate impact. The
Court also increased the burden on plaintiffs to show that a particular
group had been the subject of disparate impact as a result of an em-
ployer's use of multiple screening devices.
s' See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4 (1978); Julia Lamber, Alternatives to Challenged Employee Se-
lection Criteria: The Significance ofNonstatistical Evidence in Disparate Impact Cases Un-
der Title VII, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 1, 4 n.11 (1985).
52 See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4.
" Id. § 1607.4(D) (stating that a test or similar manner of selection will generally have an
adverse or disparate impact if it has "[a] selection rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group
which is less than four-fifths (4/5) (or eighty percent) of the rate for the group with the high-
est rate").
54 id.
s 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971); Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact:
Round Three, 117 HARv. L. REv. 493, 506-07 & n.53 (2003) (referring to the widespread
criticism over the Griggs decision, which found that Title VII applied to both disparate im-
pact and intentional discrimination claims because the language of the statute "evinced con-
gressional intent to prohibit disparate impact regardless of an employer's intentions").
56 Primus, supra note 55, at 522.
5 Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 651-52, 657 (1989).
5i See Mark Kelman, Concepts of Discrimination in "General Ability" Job Testing, 104
HARv. L. REV. 1157, 1185 (1991) ("If employers irrationally underestimate the productive
value of the tasks that members of protected groups best perform, especially if they do so ...
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Congress decided to respond to those limiting Supreme Court
decisions by enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1990, but was vetoed by
President Bush.5 9 The second attempt, the Civil Rights Act of 1991,60
was successfully enacted into law.61 One of the things that the 1991
Civil Rights Act did was enact the Griggs test into federal law.62
One further notable feature of the Ricci decision was re-
marked upon by Justice Ginsburg in her dissent. She acknowledged
that the Court had adopted a new rule, the "strong basis in evidence"
standard.63 But when the Court establishes a new rule it usually re-
mands the case to "allow the lower courts to apply the rule in the first
instance."64 Remand was not ordered in this instance, thereby, ac-
cording to Justice Ginsburg, "stack[ing] the deck further by denying
respondents any chance to satisfy [that new standard]."65 In the end,
the key issues were left unresolved by Justice Kennedy and those
who voted with him. The result is a lack of precision as to the nature
of the standard, how it should be applied, and what protection it au-
gurs for disparate impact defenses under the Equal Protection Clause.
III. GROSS V. FBL FINANCIAL SER VICES, INC.
Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. is another case involv-
ing employment discrimination. Gross involved a suit brought by an
older person, pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA).66 The majority opinion was written by Justice Thomas, and
ic validity of screening devices with disparate impact will be systematically overesti-
mated.").
5 Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and the Separation ofPowers: Statutory Inter-
pretation of Congressional Overrides, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 511, 539-40 (2009) ("Con-
gress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1990, but it was vetoed by President George H.W. Bush.
Congress narrowly failed to overcome the veto, and in 1991, Congress again addressed the
issue.").
60 Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.A.).
61 Widiss, supra note 59, at 540 ("This bill passed the Democrat-controlled House, but
largely along partisan lines.").
62 Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 3; Gwen A. Ashton, The Equal Credit Opportunity Act From
a Civil Rights Perspective: The Disparate Impact Standard, 17 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 465,
479 (1998).
63 Ricci v. DeStefano (Ricci V), 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2702 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
6 Id.
65 Id.
66 Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2347 (2009).
498 [Vol. 26
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joined by Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and
Alito. Justice Stevens, in his dissent, characterized the decision as
one in which the Court did not answer the question that was pre-
sented for review, but rather, one raised for the first time in respon-
dent's brief.67 Furthermore, Justice Stevens stated that "the majori-
ty's inattention to prudential Court practices [was] matched by its
utter disregard of our precedent and Congress' intent."68
In sum, the majority held that an ADEA plaintiff, unlike one
suing under Title VII, must establish a claim of disparate treatment
discrimination by "a preponderance of the evidence," the normal civil
suit standard.69 Title VII, in contrast, allows a plaintiff to obtain cer-
tain forms of redress by showing that the challenged personnel action
was motivated by discrimination, at least in part; this is a "mixed
motive" claim. 70 The plaintiff does not have to establish that discrim-
ination was the sole basis for the action, just that it was a "motivating
factor" in the decision-making process.n
The Court's ruling in Gross means that ADEA plaintiffs' evi-
dentiary burdens will be heavier than those under Title VII, whereas,
according to the dissent, they had been assumed to parallel one
another in prior rulings.72 Indeed, the big debate in this decision was
over whether the 1991 Civil Rights Act's explicit incorporation of the
"mixed motive" test under Title VII implicitly intended the same re-
sult with respect to the ADEA.73 Since this legislation emerged from
a series of political compromises, it has lent itself to various interpre-
tations by the Court. Here, the Court rejected the implicit incorpora-
67 Id. at 2353 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
68 Id.
69 Id. at 2352 (majority opinion).
70 See, e.g., Chadwick v. Wellpoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 45 (1st Cir. 2009); see also 42
U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(m) (West 2009) ("[An unlawful employment practice is established
when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also moti-
vated the practice.").
n1 See, e.g., Makky v. Chertoff, 541 F.3d 205, 213 (3d Cir. 2008) ("A Title VII plaintiff
may state a claim for discrimination under . . . the mixed-motive theory . . . under which a
plaintiff may show that an employment decision was made based on both legitimate and ille-
gitimate reasons.") (internal citations omitted).
72 Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2349 ("This Court has never held that this burden-shifting frame-
work applies to ADEA claims. . . . We cannot ignore Congress' decision to amend Title
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tion of the Title VII standard.74
Unlike in Ricci, it should be noted that in Gross the Court va-
cated the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case for
further proceedings consistent with its opinion." This was an oppor-
tunity for the lower courts to reconsider the case based upon that new
standard.76 This determination is another "marker," because it is es-
sentially an invitation-open or otherwise-for Congress to go back
and amend the statute, if it so desires.
IV. AT& T CoRP. v. HULTEEN
The circumstances in AT & T Corp. v. Hulteen are very much
like those in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. 7 8 In Ledbet-
ter, a woman was the victim of pay discrimination, but was not aware
of it for many years. When she found out, the statute of limitations
had expired and the Court ruled that her right to recover had been ex-
tinguished.80 Although Congress amended Title VII in that respect,
Ms. Ledbetter could not benefit from that change in the law.' In
Hulteen, a woman who was pregnant before the enactment of the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA), returned to work and
was told that she would be denied some of the seniority credit she or-
dinarily would have received, but for the fact that she had taken
pregnancy leave. 82 The question presented was whether the PDA op-
erated retroactively in circumstances such as this one?83 Justice Sou-
ter, writing for the seven-to-two majority, held that it did not.84
74 id.
7 Id. at 2352.
76 Id.
7 Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2351 ("[N]othing in the statute's text indicates that Congress has
carved out an exception to that rule for a subset of ADEA cases.").
7 550 U.S. 618 (2007).
* See id. at 621-22.
s Id. at 632.
81 Id. at 637 ("Because Ledbetter has not adduced evidence that Goodyear initially
adopted its performance-based pay system in order to discriminate on the basis of sex or that
it later applied this system to her within the charging period with any discriminatory animus,
Bazemore is of no help to her.").
82 AT & T Corp. v. Hulteen, 129 S. Ct. 1962, 1967 (2009).
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V. 14 PENN PLAZA LLC V. PYETT
The final case, 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, is one involving
arbitration. Arbitration is the "darling" of the Supreme Court of the
United States.15 Milton Friedman lived not only in the flesh, but con-
tinues to live in the way that the Supreme Court embraces arbitra-
tion.8 6  It is an agreement between knowing individuals or entities
about what is in their best economic interests. For a court or legisla-
ture to dictate how these trades should occur is something that simply
should not be generally accepted; to that end, Congress passed the
Federal Arbitration Act in 1925.87 For many years, the act was
viewed with suspicion by the federal courts. But the modem Su-
preme Court has elevated the Federal Arbitration Act to a place of re-
spect.8 8 The question is how the act fits into employment discrimina-
tion litigation.
In Pyett, Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, held that a
collective bargaining agreement arising under the ADEA of 1967,
which required that all of the union members' claims of employment
discrimination be submitted to binding arbitration, was enforceable. 89
In doing so, the Court resolved an apparent tension between two of
its earlier decisions. 90 The first was a 1974 Title VII decision, Alex-
ander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,91 which had long been thought to
stand for the proposition "that a collective bargaining agreement
could not waive covered workers' rights to a judicial forum for caus-
85 See, e.g., Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in Con-
tract Law, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 761, 776 (2002) ("Even more than those devices, however,
mandatory arbitration clauses have become not merely favorites but darlings of the courts.").
86 See Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. 1896, 1901-02 (2009) (stating that the
government should stay out of agreements to arbitrate when they are found in a contract);
Kenneth R. Davis, A Model for Arbitration Law: Autonomy, Cooperation and Curtailment of
State Power, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 167, 173 n.27 (1999) (stating that Freidman believed
the scope of government needed to be limited);
87 See 21 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 57:45 (4th ed. 2009); see also Tai Ping Ins. Co. v.
M/V Warschau, 731 F.2d 1141, 1144 (5th Cir. 1984) ("[T]he Court reiterated the strong pro-
arbitration policy embodied in the Arbitration Act: 'Congress's clear intent, in the Arbitra-
tion Act, [was] to move the parties to an arbitrable dispute out of court and into arbitration as
quickly and easily as possible.' " (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 23 (1983))).
88 See e.g., Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 405 (1967).
89 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1474 (2009).
90 See id. at 1468-69.
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es of action created by Congress." 92 The other was a 1991 decision
under the ADEA, Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.93 The
Court " 'held that an individual employee who had agreed individual-
ly to waive his right to a federal forum could be compelled to arbi-
trate a federal age discrimination claim.' "94
The lower courts had been struggling with how to reconcile
those precedents. 95 Justice Thomas reasoned that, since unions are
authorized under federal labor law to represent workers on a wide
range of issues, they also should be authorized to waive their mem-
bers' access to a judicial forum and require arbitration instead.96 JUS-
tice Souter, in the principal dissent, charged the majority with a fail-
ure to respect stare decisis, and an evasion of a relevant precedent
"simply by ignoring it." 97 According to Justice Souter, Justice Tho-
mas' opinion is a complete revisionist view of what happened in
Gardner-Denver.9 8 But Justice Thomas' response is about as full-
throated an endorsement of arbitration as one will read anywhere in
the United States Reports. He argued that the majority in Garnder-
Denver was "highly critical of the use of arbitration for the vindica-
tion of statutory antidiscrimination rights,"99 and went on to say
"[t]hat skepticism, however, rested on a misconceived view of arbi-
tration that this Court has since abandoned." 00 In his view, there was
no reason to believe that federal courts were in a better position than
the parties themselves to resolve these types of disputes fairly and
consistent with the interest of employees and workers.'01
Although this is an ADEA decision, the question becomes
92 Pyett, 129 S. Ct. at 1463 (quoting Pyett v. Pa. Bldg. Co., 498 F.3d 88, 92 n.3 (2d Cir.
2007)).
1 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991).
94 Pyett, 129 S. Ct. at 1463 (quoting Pa. Bldg. Co., 498 F.3d at 92 n.3).
9 Id. at 1463, 1473-74.
96 Id. at 1473 ("Given this avenue that Congress has made available to redress a union's
violation of its duty to its members, it is particularly inappropriate to ask this Court to im-
pose an artificial limitation on the collective-bargaining process.").
97 Id. at 1478 (Souter, J., dissenting).
98 Id. at 1479 ("When the majority does speak to Gardner-Denver, it misreads the
case. . . .").
99 Pyett, 129 S. Ct. at 1469 (majority opinion).
100 Id.
101 See id. at 1471 ("According to the Court, the 'factfinding process in arbitration' is 'not
equivalent to judicial factfinding' and the 'informality of arbitral procedure . . . makes arbi-
tration a less appropriate forum for final resolution of Title VII issues than the federal
courts.' "(quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57-58 (1974))).
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whether the Court's holding will be applied across the board to other
federal employment discrimination statutes.102 The primary statutory
framework, of course, is the 1964 Civil Rights Act. In recent years
the Supreme Court has handed down decisions, however, arising un-
der post-1964 "progeny" statutes that have curtailed their effective-
ness.103
102 Id. at 1469-70 (discussing agreements to arbitrate Title VII claims as opposed to arbi-
trating claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 specifically).
103 Drew S. Days III, "Feedback Loop": The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and its Progeny, 49
ST. Louis U. L.J. 981, 988-90 (2005) (discussing how the Supreme Court has taken decisions
under the provisions subsequent to the 1964 Civil Rights Act and applied them to the origi-
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